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Abstract  
Some past events incite more wonder about their causes than do others. For example, negative 
events require explanation more than positive events. We review social psychologists’ 
theoretical and empirical insights on what kinds of past events ‘beg explanation.’ We draw on 
attribution theory that became popular among psychologists from the 1960s onward, on 
research on counterfactual reasoning, and on conversational and discursive critiques of 
attribution theory. We argue that factors predicting what is or is not perceived as requiring 
explanation are culturally and historically grounded, and that accordingly, what begs 
explanation varies between contexts and can change over time. Yet, drawing on the 
distinction between content and process, we argue that there are recognizable patterns across 
time and space. Specifically, we propose the relationship between events and background 
expectations as a rather stable predictor of what begs explanation – and as a level of analysis 
that can unite seemingly disparate approaches. 
 
Keywords: causal attribution, history, culture, discourse, cognition 
 
  
When do past events require explanation? 4 
When Do Past Events Require Explanation? Insights From Social Psychology  
Consider the following research findings: (a) In a recent global survey of 
representations of history, the event that was listed most often as an important ‘historical 
event’ was World War II (Liu et al., 2009); (b) research on so-called ‘flashbulb memories’ 
indicates that extremely detailed and vivid memories of when and how one has learned of a 
public event are usually produced by important, surprising, and emotionally upsetting 
incidents such as the assassination of US president John F. Kennedy (Luminet & Spijkerman, 
this issue); (c) such unexpected, tragic, and self-relevant events also seem most likely to 
prompt the prolific type of explanatory thinking referred to as ‘conspiracy theorizing’ 
(Douglas & van Prooijen, this issue). As these examples illustrate, certain kinds of historical 
events incite more wonder about their causes than do others. We examine what social 
psychology can teach us about what kinds of past events ‘lay historians’ (i.e., lay people 
thinking about historic events, Klein, 2013) perceive as requiring explanation.  
We focus on lay explanations (rather than explanations generated by academically 
trained historians) because social psychology has mostly been concerned with explanations 
created by ordinary people. Yet, we expect that our analysis will be interesting for 
‘professional’ historians. Professional and lay understandings of the past inform and influence 
each other (Tosh, 2008), and historians, too, pay close attention to ordinary people’s 
explanations (e.g., Millstone, 2014) and to popular and public understandings and uses of the 
past (e.g., Gillis, 1994; Hobsbawm, 1992). We will mention several examples for possible 
points of connection between the works of social psychologists and historians,1 and hope that 
our historian readers will see further ways in which the approaches and findings we review 
might inform historical research.  
For social psychologists, we hope to show how engaging with history – both, the 
psychology of history and the history of psychology – can inform and enrich our own work. 
Focusing on the psychology of explanation as an example, we show how engaging with 
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history allows us to go beyond merely summarizing the insights gained by previous work; by 
critically examining how key insights were reached in the past we can carve out how original 
insights might be gained in the future.  
Throughout this article we will be going back and forth between discussing the history 
of psychology, the psychology of history, and their interaction, and expect that different 
readers will find different aspects most appealing. We first turn to psychologists’ attempts to 
understand how people explain events, specifically, to theories of ‘causal attribution’ that 
captured the attention of social psychologists in the United States from the 1960s onward. 
However, our discussion will focus less on how people explain than on what they seek to 
explain in the first place. To address this question, we will discuss insights gained by 
attribution research as well as by later developments in the field including critiques of this 
classic approach. We focus on what begs explanation because, as we shall see below, what is 
(or is not) perceived as requiring explanation can subsequently shape how explanations are 
constructed. The question of what begs explanation is thus the primary one.  
We will argue that while the content of explanations is culturally and historically 
grounded and can therefore change over time, at least some of the psychological processes 
underlying the perceived need for explanation will be more stable. More specifically, we 
propose the relationship between (historic) events and implicit background expectations as 
one potentially stable ingredient in the process of explaining, thus providing a level of 
analysis that can unite seemingly disparate approaches. Following Vendler (1967), we define 
events quite broadly, namely as any segments of time that can be distinguished from the 
surrounding ‘flow’ of time, by virtue of (being perceived as) having an identifiable beginning 
and ending. We suggest that a more complete understanding of how people make sense of the 
past can be reached by redirecting attention from the events themselves to their taken-for-
granted background aspects.  
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The Development of Attribution Theory in Social Psychology 
Most psychological work on explanations concerns causal attribution, that is, the 
process by which people attribute causes to events.2 This approach departs from Fritz 
Heider’s (1958) attempts to understand naïve psychology. Heider analogized people as 
‘intuitive scientists’ who systematically analyze each others’ behavior in order to understand 
the underlying motivations and intentions as well as to account for successes and failures. 
While Heider’s work was mainly theoretical, his analyses were influential during a time when 
social psychology was increasingly being imagined, funded, and actualized in the US as an 
experimental science. During the 1960s, social psychologists constructed increasingly 
elaborate experimental scenarios, and explanations of social behavior focused more and more 
on cognitions in the minds of individuals (Collier, Minton, & Reynolds, 1991).  
In one classic study, participants read essays for or against Fidel Castro and were 
asked to guess the alleged author’s true opinion (Jones & Harris, 1967). An enduring 
contribution of these studies was the discovery that people attribute behavior 
disproportionally to causes that lie within the person (such as the author’s personal opinion) 
and do not fully take situational pressures into account (such as the information that the 
author had been instructed to take a certain position). This tendency was later dubbed the 
‘fundamental attribution error’ (Ross, 1977). However, the influence of history on this work 
was not limited to the choice of debate topics (i.e., Fidel Castro). As social psychology 
became experimental, it relied increasingly on inferential statistics to interpret results. In turn, 
statistical tools became a heuristic for theory development (Gigerenzer, 1991), most 
obviously in a model of attribution that Kelley (1967) presented in analogy to the statistical 
procedure Analysis of Variance. According to that model, people systematically examine how 
much an observed behavior varies between individuals, contexts, and over time to decide 
whether this behavior is caused by the person or the situation. While not explicitly focused on 
attribution ‘biases’, this model still contributed to an enduring trend in social psychology to 
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interpret ordinary people’s attributions for events as biased against a background normative 
ideal of a statistically-oriented social science.  
More recent work on causal attribution has moved away from this tendency to 
interpret lay explanations as irrational and biased; it has also moved away from the dichotomy 
between explanations that focus on characteristics of individuals versus the surrounding 
circumstances. In partial return to Heider’s original work, recent models suggest that lay 
explanations are more sophisticated. For example, people distinguish between intentional and 
unintentional behaviors, and between different types of reasons and conditions for intentional 
behaviors (Böhm & Pfister, 2015; Malle, Knobe, O’Laughlin, Pearce, & Nelson, 2000). These 
developments in attribution research may be useful for historians, as they, too, have examined 
the role of (perceived) rationality and irrationality in public discourse and representations of 
‘the public’ (e.g., Knights, 2005). 
Together, research on causal attribution has led to clear insights into how people 
explain certain types of events when asked directly why they occurred. Some of these insights 
have been fruitfully applied to historical cognition (e.g., Bilewicz, this issue). Yet, most 
classic research on causal attribution is only indirectly relevant to our question of what begs 
explanation in history. Experiments on causal attribution have mostly addressed the question 
of which explanations people prefer when given a choice between different options. The 
question what people perceive as requiring an explanation in the first place (whether and 
when they spontaneously make attributions), has received considerably less attention in 
attribution research. We turn to this question next.  
Psychological Research on What Events Beg Explanation 
Drawing on the different psychological approaches that we discuss in this article, we 
have synthesized an overview of characteristics of events that beg explanation (see Table 1). 
Research on spontaneous attributions has suggested three factors that robustly predict the 
active construction of explanations. People spontaneously explain events that are unexpected 
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or appear surprising; they explain negative events more than positive ones; and they tend to 
explain events that are self-relevant (see Weiner, 1985). Even though attribution research has 
mostly been concerned with explanations of the behavior of individuals in everyday human 
interactions, these findings go some way towards understanding which historical events will 
prompt an explanation. Both novelty/surprise and self-relevance/importance are also 
important predictors of flashbulb memories (Luminet & Spijkerman, this issue), and they also 
align with findings of global surveys about world history (Liu et al., 2009). Wars are most 
often named as events of historic importance, and wars are both negative and surprising when 
set against the desire of almost all people to live in peace. Moreover, participants in these 
surveys most often mentioned recent events and events in their own countries, suggesting an 
influence of self-relevance.  
Importantly, unexpectedness is not inherent in events themselves but describes the 
relations between events and expectations. War is surprising if we expect people to want to 
live in peace, but not when we consider that violent intergroup conflicts are frequent. 
Accordingly, a full psychological explanation of surprisingness must account for the often 
silent expectations or background ‘norms’ of how events will unfold. Kahneman and Miller 
(1986) developed a systematic account of the cognitive process by which such mental event 
norms are constructed. They argued that an event (e.g., a war) will activate memories of 
similar events (other wars) which will then form the normative expectancy against which the 
current event is compared. Differences between the current event and that background event 
norm, both beg explanation and seem to begin to explain how the event might have turned out 
differently – an example of how what begs explanation influences how explanations are 
constructed. For example, the Hundred Years’ War implicitly brings other wars to mind. 
Based on these, one forms an implicit expectation of wars’ characteristics, such as their 
duration. This makes the Hundred Years’ War appear abnormally long, thus prompting such 
questions as Why did this war last so long? Could it have ended earlier? How so?  
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Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) norm theory inspired considerable experimental 
research on counterfactual thinking (see Roese, 1997) – the tendency to think counter to the 
facts after an event has occurred. Rather than as ‘intuitive scientists’ systematically analyzing 
behavior, these approaches saw people as mental ‘reconstructors’ (Alicke et al., 2015) who 
made sense of events by imagining how things might have turned out differently. This 
research concluded that people are particularly likely to ponder ‘what if (not)?’ and to 
spontaneously construct explanations when it is easy to imagine an alternative course of 
events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). For example, because it is easier to imagine that 
individuals could have acted differently than to imagine different laws of nature, events 
(perceived as) caused by human action, such as an assassination or a suicide, will beg 
explanation more so than comparable events (perceived as) caused by ‘natural causes’, such 
as dying of old age. 
One insight of particular relevance to historical cognition is the importance of 
temporal order. Causes precede effects and it seems easier to imagine that a situation turned 
out differently (e.g., Franz Ferdinand of Austria could have survived the assassin’s shots in 
Sarajevo in 1914) than to imagine a different background situation (e.g., Franz Ferdinand 
could have stayed at home). However, even when two events are not causally related, lay 
people spontaneously imagine alternatives to later events more so than to earlier events. 
Teigen (2004) demonstrated this by presenting participants with statistical records collected in 
different years, for example, the number of Norwegian immigrants to the US in 1870 and 
1880. When asked what might explain the difference, participants focused their explanations 
overwhelmingly on the later statistics. They took the earlier statistics as background norms 
and asked the counterfactual question why things changed rather than stayed the same; rarely 
did they ask the equally valid question why the first statistic was different from the later 
one(s).  
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Individual historical events, however, are compared against the background ‘flow’ of 
time, making the counterfactual question why the event occurred at all the central one. Both 
psychologists (Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001) and historians (White, 1973) have noted that 
time does not come pre-packaged as ‘events’ but needs to be actively constructed as such. 
Events are what appears to stand out against a background of a more normal (less spectacular) 
state of affairs. Accordingly, (sudden) changes, differences, and actions suggest the presence 
of an event and provide occasions for explanation more than continuity, sameness, and 
inaction do. These observations are important because events and transitions between events 
can be constructed in a number of different ways. For instance, the same transition can be 
narrated as an ending or a beginning, as the familiar cry of succession The king is dead, long 
live the king exemplifies. However, we argue that beginnings are more essential for 
understanding why an event occurred. Accordingly, we have recently shown that when 
thinking about a particular event, people are more interested in learning about its beginning 
than its ending (Teigen, Böhm, Bruckmüller, Hegarty, & Luminet, 2016, see also Zerubavel’s 
work on the significance of origin myths).  
Understanding event norms as cognitions that are constantly constructed and re-
constructed also means that events can change those background norms. Indeed, the most 
surprising historical events are those – often ‘firsts’ – that irrevocably change our assumptions 
about what we can take for granted. For example, women’s right to vote may have seemed 
unthinkable at the beginning of Western democracies and its introduction meant a remarkable 
change for contemporaries. Yet, it is now so taken for granted that people rarely ask how 
women’s right to vote came about – and consequently often fail to recognize the role of 
feminist movements in achieving these rights (Vernet & Butera, 2005). Accordingly, one 
central goal of gender history has been to counteract such forgetting by illuminating women’s 
agency in the past (see J. W. Scott, 1999). Such changes in background norms may also help 
to explain the hindsight bias, that is, the inclination, after an event has occurred, to perceive 
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its outcomes as more predictable than they could have been beforehand (see Klein, Hegarty, 
& Fischoff, this issue).  
In sum, research on counterfactual thinking seems more directly relevant to the 
question of what begs explanation in history than does classic attribution research. In fact, 
counterfactual thinking is a common, albeit controversial, approach to understanding history 
(Tetlock & Lebow, 2001). It allows both lay historians and experts to approach the causal 
question for events that are unique and not amenable to experimentation. Historians have been 
critical of the conflation of historical counterfactual thinking with causal thinking (Fischer, 
1970). Psychologists have also shown that the question of why an event happened and the 
question of how an event might be undone are more distinct than Kahneman and Miller 
(1986) originally suggested (Mandel & Lehman, 1996). Most importantly though, norm 
theory highlights that the answer to the question ‘what begs explanation’ has many features, 
that this answer lies in the relationship between the background norm and the event itself, and 
that different background norms can be constructed by the same event. For example, women’s 
suffrage may inspire the question of why it came about so late or the opposing question of 
how it was possible at all, depending on the context in which the question is asked and on 
what background expectations are most available in that context. We now turn to later 
developments in the field of attribution research that were informed by this approach.  
Conversational and Discursive Approaches to Attribution 
In the late 1980s, critics of classic attribution models (in the US and elsewhere) 
suggested that explanations are best understood not by analyzing cognitive processes in the 
minds of individuals, but by understanding explanations as taking place in, and taking the 
form of, conversation (see Hilton, 1990). Explanations are thus embedded in interpersonal 
relationships and guided by rules of discourse. Conversation partners typically rely on a 
‘common ground’ of shared knowledge (Clark, 1996), that is, information that all parties are 
assumed to know or see as self-evident. Explanations will typically not evoke aspects 
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presumably known by all parties involved in the conversation, but rather, it will focus on 
‘new’ information that goes beyond this common ground. For example, explanations of why 
the Cuban Missile Crisis did not result in a war will not focus on the observation that a war 
between countries with nuclear weapons is undesirable – not because that fact is considered 
irrelevant, but because it is considered common ground and thus goes without saying.  
Understanding explanations as conversations also highlights that explanations have 
consequences. Explaining something or allowing it to ‘go without saying’ not only engages 
the common ground; it also reinforces the respective shared ideas or builds new common 
ground (Kashima, Klein, & Clark, 2007). That is, explaining things can give them a reality 
that they did not previously possess. Anderson, Lepper, and Ross (1980) demonstrated this by 
presenting their participants with bogus information about either a positive or a negative 
association between risk-seeking and effectiveness as a firefighter that participants were then 
asked to explain. Later, some participants were informed that the data were fake and that they 
had been randomly assigned to read about either a positive or a negative association. Yet, 
when these participants were subsequently asked what they thought the true relationship was, 
they still endorsed the relationship that they had explained. Thus, the mere act of explaining 
(versus not explaining) created a subjective reality that was subsequently difficult to change – 
a process that occurred regardless of the specific content of the explanation. In a second 
experiment, merely reading about a positive or negative association (without being asked to 
explain it) had a similar, albeit weaker belief-creating effect. An similar effect has been 
observed by historians of the early modern period in Protestant England. Once political crises 
were explained as something triggered by Catholics, governments and the press continued to 
characterize subsequent crises as plotted by the same minority (Lake, 1989). 
An even more radical critique of classic attribution theories than this conversational 
approach was issued by discursive psychologists. They argued that the main reason why 
people engage in explaining is not to (individually or conversationally) make sense of events; 
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instead, explanation is a social action, and is oriented towards doing such things as blaming, 
shifting responsibility, apologizing, and claiming ownership (Edwards & Potter, 1993). For 
example, explaining the Nazi Party’s success in Germany in the 1930s with the conditions of 
the Versailles Treaty can be an attempt at understanding the Nazis’ rise to power, an excuse 
for the allure of Nazi rhetoric for contemporary Germans, an attribution of (partial) blame to 
the Allied Powers, or all of the above, depending on context. More generally, in any 
engagement with the past in which individual or group interests are at stake and whenever 
(collective and/or individual) emotions are involved, explanations of events are “not a neutral 
business of making the best sense of experience” (Edwards & Potter, 1993; pp. 24-25), an 
aspect of historical explanation especially conspicuous in modern histories of former 
European colonies (Woolf, 2011). Discursive psychologists argue that explanations are 
inextricably linked to social dynamics and relations between groups; they are actions with 
consequences, located in social contexts. Hilton, Erb, Dermot, and Molian (1996) provide an 
example of such consequences of different lay explanations of past events for intergroup 
relations in the present. Their participants in the UK and France were more supportive of 
European unification the more they attributed Hitler’s rise to power to the conditions of the 
Versailles Treaty – and less supportive to the extent that they explained it via more ‘internal’ 
attributes of Germany such as a lack of a democratic tradition before World War I. Similarly, 
in Germany the question of how to explain the Nazis’ rise to power and/or the Holocaust – 
asked by historians as well as by lay people – has repeatedly caused fierce public and political 
disputes, most prominently in the so-called Historikerstreit (the “historians’ dispute”) in the 
1980s (Berger, 1997). 
Applying a discursive framework to the question of what begs explanation in history, 
explaining should happen whenever individual or group interests are at stake. This may sound 
very similar to classic attribution approaches’ insight that self-relevance triggers attribution. 
Yet, a discursive perspective not only suggests a more contextual answer to this question, but 
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foregrounds that explanations are not just reflective of cognition, but are also performative. 
As speech acts, explanations can be made strategically by historians, politicians, or anybody 
else having a stake in present-day representations of the past, as they can serve political 
agendas in the present. This might almost sound like a truism to historians who (together with 
colleagues in other social sciences and humanities) have long embraced the idea that language 
is performative (see Woolf, 2011). Psychologists have, however, been a bit slower to pick up 
this idea, illustrating differences in ‘common ground’ between disciplines.  
One example of the performative aspect of what is explained and what is considered 
common ground are explanations of group differences and related power dynamics. 
Foucault’s (1975/1995) description of the emergence of disciplinary power in Western 
Europe illustrates a form of power generated by academic disciplines such as psychiatry and 
criminology that disempowers people such as mentally ill or criminal individuals by making 
them particularly visible and by simultaneously making those exercising this power invisible. 
In line with this argument, social psychological research on the explanation of group 
differences consistently shows that people – lay persons as well as psychologists – tend to 
focus explanations of group differences (e.g., gender differences) on the behavior of 
historically lower-status groups (e.g., women), not on the behavior of historically higher-
status groups (e.g., men). These habits of explaining reinforce the behavior of higher-status 
groups as the (invisible) standard that goes without saying. Accordingly, research shows that 
such explanations have consequences, for example, for the status and power ascribed to the 
respective groups, for stereotypes, and for self-perceptions of members of stigmatized groups 
(Bruckmüller, 2013; Hegarty & Bruckmüller, 2013). These findings are important to 
psychologists because they make us uncomfortably aware of political implications of our 
seemingly neutral explanations of human behavior. They are important to historians, because 
they warn that explanations can themselves influence history. Historians are aware that 
limiting accounts of history to the role of those in power could reinforce existing power 
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relationships (J.C. Scott, 1990). Yet, our findings on the explanation of group differences 
warn that particularizing historical analyses that focus on subordinate groups as special (e.g., 
‘women’s history’, ‘indigenous history’) while deeming the history of powerful groups 
simply ‘history,’ will not be enough to challenge existing power relationships (see also J. W. 
Scott, 1999, preface). It might even subtly perpetuate them.  
What Social Psychologists Can Learn By Engaging With History 
We set out to examine what social psychology can teach us about what, in history, 
seems to beg explanation. Along the way, we have narrated a brief history of attribution 
research. Some contemporary psychologists speculated that future historians of psychology 
would deem the 1970s the decade of attribution theory. Yet, present day social psychologists 
also remember the 1970s as a decade of crisis (Faye, 2012). Social psychology’s social 
relevance was called into question, as its experiments seemed increasingly removed from 
real-world concerns – including movements for peace, civil rights, and women’s rights. 
Critics emphasized that the field failed to conceptualize how its answers to questions were 
embedded within historically particular frames of reference (Gergen, 1973), that those 
answers applied only to North American cultures (Israel & Tajfel, 1972), and that 
experiments were often unethical and coercive (see Collier et al., 1991). With the benefit of 
hindsight, we might speculate why this particular version of attribution theory emerged from 
social psychology’s crisis. Unlike the previous generation of social psychologists who aimed 
at historical levels of explanation – most notoriously Milgram (1963), who attempted to 
understand the Holocaust through experiments on obedience – attribution researchers rarely 
attended to historical frames of reference; paper and pencil experiments raise few ethical risks 
and can be conducted in less well-funded times and places. As such, attribution research 
allowed social psychologists to go forward with a less controversial experimental science that 
still engaged how people made sense of events.  
This work led to some clear answers to the question of what is most likely to beg 
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explanation (see Table 1). However, our table could also be read as a recipe for innovative 
explanations of events. As intimated above, the factors predicting what is and is not seen as 
requiring explanation are culturally and historically grounded, and accordingly, what begs 
explanation varies between contexts and can change over time. For example, while 
contemporaries of the disastrous 1755 earthquake in Portugal spent considerable time and 
effort debating its causes (specifically, whether it should be explained by natural causes or the 
wrath of God, Udidas, 2009), we might now simply accept that such natural disasters happen 
and have less interest in explaining the particulars of how this earthquake came about. 
Referring to the determinants summarized in Table 1, we might explain this change by 
differences in the extent to which people then and now perceive(d) earthquakes as caused by 
(super)human agency and/or by the high stakes that only contemporaries had in the 
implications of different explanations.  
This example again illustrates the importance of distinguishing between content and 
process. The content of explanations – both which particular events are perceived as requiring 
explanation and the actual content of these explanations – may change over time. Yet, we 
would expect at least some of the processes that prompt explanations, such as surprise, 
emotional involvement, or power dynamics, to stay relatively stable over time (see Table 1, 
third column). We further propose that such stable processes include the psychological 
relationship between events and underlying implicit assumptions of what the normal state of 
affairs is. We further suggest a figure-background metaphor as a useful approach to 
understanding how people make sense of the past. A more complete and counter-intuitive 
understanding of any event may be reached by historians, social psychologists, or anybody 
else by producing figure-ground reversals and by asking questions about the non-eventful 
background aspects of a situation (e.g., incidents of nations living in peace that are rarely 
addressed by historians, see Mahatma Ghandi as cited in Woolf, 2011, p. 497).  
In support of this claim, we note that historically, attribution theory has often 
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advanced most obviously – at least in retrospect – when foundational assumptions that were 
part of the taken-for-granted background have been challenged, that is, when they became 
focal ‘figures’ in critical analysis. The ‘fundamental attribution error’ became part of the 
common ground early on (Ross, 1977). However, the rise of new (probabilistic rather than 
frequentist) statistical procedures inspired a new look at classic data leading to the conclusion 
that the extent and generality of this attribution error had been overstated (Morris & Larrick, 
1995). Cross-cultural research demonstrated that this attributional style was culturally 
particular, and social and cultural psychologists have since debated the extent to which 
attributional patterns differ by culture and beg culturally particular or more universal 
explanations (e.g., Norenzayan & Nisbett, 2000). Conversational and discursive approaches 
have led to a re-thinking of the common ground of social psychological theory by focusing on 
how experimenters and participants actively construct meaning in experimental contexts. 
Another example of psychologists challenging the common ground of psychological science 
are attempts at decolonizing psychology, that is, at critically examining the role a Euro-
American-centered psychological science may play in maintaining the power of a privileged 
minority of people in affluent societies over a disadvantaged global majority. One way to do 
so is to make visible and thereby challenge implicit Euro-American-centric assumptions of 
normality in psychology and to preferentially side with global majority perspectives in 
formulating theory (see e.g., Adams, Bruckmüller, & Decker, 2012).  
However, whilst experimental attribution theory’s search for universal laws can only 
take us so far in accounting for what begs explanation, contextual discursive studies of 
explanation run the risk of losing sight of such consistent habits of explanation as those 
summarized in Table 1. Discourse analysts have been particularly hostile to cognitive 
explanations in psychology, preferring to re-locate traditional topics of social psychology, 
such as attitudes, stereotypes, and the self, in discourse that is culturally and historically 
specific (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Yet, at an ontological level, discursive and conversational 
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approaches both require an understanding of how people hold in mind (or not) what the 
common ground of a conversation is, and what their stake in an argument might be. We 
suggest that a level of analysis akin to that posited by Kahneman and Miller (1986) that lies 
between event perception and norms constructed from memory traces might unify 
understanding of what begs explanation, where, why and for whom. Because such norms are 
collectively organized, and can change in irreversible ways, they are in part historical entities. 
Developing this level of analysis will hence require the continued collaboration of social 
psychologists and historians.   
Historians are of course not simply interested in what begs explanation, but in how 
explanations are stitched into particular narratives that organize and give meaning to 
experience. White (1973) proposed that history is best thought of not as an objective 
collection of facts but as a narrative that is selectively employed by different agents for 
different agendas. Psychologists have already started to make connections with these insights 
(e.g., Liu & Hilton, 2005). White further urged the writing of ironic histories in which 
different narratives clash uncomfortably keeping alive our questions of what the past has 
been. We hope to have followed this advice and to ironically have shown that if we want to 
find out what begs explanation in history, we need to realize how history itself shapes what 
begs explanation. 
  
When do past events require explanation? 19 
Notes 
1 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out many of these connections. 
2 We limit our discussion to the aspects most relevant to our analysis; for more comprehensive 
histories of attribution research see, Alicke, Mandel, Hilton, Gerstenberg, & Lagnado 
(2015); Malle (2011). 
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Table 1. What social psychology can tell us about when people do (or do not) feel inclined to 




What is explained (in 
general) 
Specific examples 
Classic approaches to 
causal attribution 
Events that inspire 
spontaneous attribution 
• Unexpected/surprising events or features of 
events (rather than those that are expected) 
• Negative events (more so than positive 
ones) 
• Events that have (rather than do not have) 
self-relevance 
Event perception  Events that appear 
‘figural’ against the 
background flow of time 
• Occurrences, actions, and commissions 
(rather than non-events, inaction, and 
omissions) 
• Changes (rather than stability) 
• Differences (rather than similarities) 
• Perceived patterns and regularities, such as 
trends, correlations and coincidences 
• Momentous and consequential events 
(rather than trivial and mundane events) 
Norm theory/ 
Counterfactual reasoning 
Events that fall outside 
mental norms 
• Events that appear ‘abnormal’, 
outstanding, or deviant (rather than those 
that fit with implicit defaults) 
 Events for which 
alternatives come to 
mind easily 
• Events or features of events that appear 
mutable (rather than those that appear 
immutable) 
• Events or features of events perceived as 
controllable by human agency (rather than 
those that appear uncontrollable, i.e., natural 
processes 
• In a chain or series of events: later events 
(rather than earlier ones) 
• Within the same event: beginnings (more so 
than endings) 
• But also: recent events (rather than 
temporally remote ones) 
Conversational approach  Information that is 
necessary to establish 
‘common ground’ 
• New information (rather than things 
assumed to be known by all participants in a 
conversation) 
• Unclear or ambiguous events or features of 
events (rather than those that appear obvious 
or self-evident) 
• Events that have been discussed extensively, 
e.g., in the media  
Discursive approach Events whose 
explanations serve a 
purpose (in a particular 
context) 
• Events for which individual or group 
interests are at stake (rather than not), e.g., 
claiming ownership, blaming, diverting 
responsibility, apologizing 
• Events that arouse emotions (rather than 
those that do not) 
Note: These determinants are not mutually exclusive and often overlap. For example, changes, human 
actions, and later observations are all perceived as more ‘mutable’ than their counterparts. 
 
